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Abstract 
 This paper is an analysis of what is deemed the “immigration crisis” in Europe as it 
affects the country of Italy. Originally, I had theorized that the effects of the immigration crisis 
on Italy were due solely to the failings of the Schengen Agreement. However, upon further 
research, I concluded the problems of the Schengen are only one part of a larger picture that 
finds its beginnings in the economic problems of Italy. The worldwide economic crisis of 2008 
and the actions of the European Central Bank in the wake of the crisis created a separation in the 
European Union between larger central countries such as Germany and France, and smaller 
border countries such as Italy and Greece. The feelings of abandonment and alienization that 
were sparked in Italy during this time began the country’s disillusionment with the European 
Union, and these feelings were only exacerbated when the waves of immigrants began to pour in 
in 2015, and Schengen area countries began to close their internal borders and trap the 
immigrants and asylum-seekers in Italy, thus worsening the economic, social, and political 
problems that the country was already facing. In addition, my research prompted me to draw the 
conclusion that the underlying problem is the failure of the globalization that is seen in the 
European Union. Therefore, this paper theorizes that the current immigration crisis is not a crisis 
in and of itself, but provided the stimuli needed to create a crisis from the pre-existing problems 
in Italy and in the European Union.  
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Introduction 
 In 2014, hundreds of thousands of immigrants and asylum-seekers began to enter into 
Greece and Italy via the Mediterranean Sea. The majority of these people were African nationals 
and were attempting to enter Europe through illegal means including smuggling. In the early 
months, these countries were able to control the immigrants and asylum-seekers. However, the 
waves soon turned into a flood, and Italy and Greece began to become overwhelmed. In 2015, 
this situation was named the “immigration crisis.”  
 The immigration crisis poses many problems for the countries at its forefront. Italy is one 
of the countries most affected by this situation, as its southernmost border and islands are only a 
short distance from northern African countries such as Libya and Tunisia, the origin points of 
many illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers attempting to find new lives in Europe. It seems as 
if Italy has been hit extraordinarily hard by the immigration crisis, but, when looking more 
closely at the situation, it is evident that the problems that Italy is facing now are pre-existing 
problems that have been exacerbated by the increase in immigration, causing a crisis situation.  
 Italy’s immigration policies, most importantly the Schengen Agreement, have come into 
question in the new social and political climate created by the rise in immigration. This policy, 
which ensures that all people can move freely within the external borders of the Schengen area, 
has become problematic as member countries have begun to close their borders. The willingness 
of countries to close their borders, thus trapping immigrants and asylum-seekers in Italy, stems 
from long-standing tensions between the larger internal European Union countries such as 
Germany and France and the smaller outer countries such as Italy and Greece. These tensions 
within the European Union are not a new development and have stemmed from the actions of the 
European Union and the European Central Bank during the worldwide economic crisis of 2008. 
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Italy’s economy took a hit during the crisis, and its weakened state has been extremely 
susceptible to the damaging effects of the rise in immigration in the recent years. The weak 
economy has thus led to a disillusionment within Italy with the European Union, and the rise of 
many radical political parties calling for an end to immigration and a separation from the EU and 
its policies. This is a web of interconnected pre-existing problems in Italy. The rise in 
immigration was the spark that was needed for these problems to grow and come together to 
create a state of crisis in Italy. Therefore, the immigration crisis is not truly a crisis in and of 
itself, but is instead a combination of many crises that have existed in Italy for decades, including 
the country’s poor economy and the economic crisis of 2008, the flaws in European Union 
immigration policy, the unstable government, and a history of anti-immigrant sentiment. 
  
Salachi 6 
 
Methodology 
 In this literature review, resources used included scholarly journals, newspaper articles, 
books, and government websites. Primary sources used included the websites of the European 
Parliament, the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International 
Organization for Migration, ISTAT, and the Istituti Affari Internazionali, among others, from 
which scholarly articles and data were retrieved. The section titled “What Does This Reveal 
About Globalization?” is based primarily on Dani Rodrik’s 2011 book, The Globalization 
Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy. This paper is based fully on print 
and online sources due to logistical problems regarding the topic and the area studied. Due to 
lack of connections and resources, it was impossible to gain first-hand access to the area of 
focus, acquire data, and conduct interviews.  
 The conclusions of this paper were arrived at after extensive research. During the 
research process, it was discovered that the initial hypothesis was extremely limited, and thus 
was changed to allow for a more comprehensive view on the issue. Through researching the 
problems addressed individually, a second hypothesis— that the underlying problem is the 
globalization of the European Union— was developed. In the literature review, the hypotheses 
were explored and allowed for the conclusion to be reached.  
  
 
  
Salachi 7 
 
Background 
a. Recent World Migration Trends  
Understanding world migration trends in recent years is necessary to understanding the 
scale of the immigration crisis in the European Union, which provides a backdrop for the 
situation in Italy. The year 2015 was a turning point for world migration, beginning what is 
referred to as the immigration crisis, because over one million immigrants arrived in Europe by 
sea (McAuliffe and Ruhs, 2018). According to the International Organization for Migration’s 
2018 Global Migration Trends Factsheet— in which the most recent data is from 2015 to 2017— 
the number of international migrants globally in 2015 was the highest ever recorded at 244 
million, having risen from 222 million in 2010 and up 41 percent since 2000. In 2015, migration 
flows south to south across developing countries showed more growth— at 90.2 million 
international migrants— than south to north migration flows from developing countries to 
developed countries—at 85.3 million migrants. Though the number of immigrants in developed 
countries is rising, developing countries continue to host the most immigrants (McAuliffe and 
Ruhs, 2018).  
The United States remained the most popular destination for international migrants, with 
Germany rising to second place and Russia coming in third. In 2015, Germany saw 
approximately 12 million foreign-born individuals residing in the country. Italy ranks at the 
eleventh most popular destination for migrants globally, falling at the fifth most popular 
destination in Europe. However, the majority of all refugees continues to be hosted by 
developing countries. The Gulf Cooperation Council nations—primarily the United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait—continue to have the highest percentages of immigrants in their 
country populations (Global migration trends factsheet, 2015). Understanding the rising levels of 
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immigrants in Europe, particularly Germany, provides a necessary background for understanding 
the crisis. 
 A rise in forced migration is one reason for the overall rise in migration in 2015. Forced 
migrants refer to those displaced by “persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or human rights 
violations” (Global migration trends factsheet, p.8, 2015). As reported by the International 
Organization for Migration’s 2015 Global Migration Trends Factsheet, forced migration 
increased by 5.8 million people from 2014 to 2015, totaling 65.3 million of the total 244 million 
migrants worldwide in 2015. In 2015, the total of 65.3 million forced migrants included 21.3 
million refugees, 40.8 million internally displaced people, and 3.2 million asylum seekers. Due 
in large part to the Syrian conflict, the number of refugees has increased by 55% since 2011. In 
2015, the Syrian Arab Republic produced the most refugees, at 4.9 million, followed by 
Afghanistan and Somalia. Turkey and Pakistan are the main host countries for all refugees, 
hosting 2.5 million and 1.6 million refugees respectively in 2015 (Global migration trends 
factsheet, 2015). Forced migration plays a large role in the European immigration crisis because 
it accounts for the majority of the immigrants who have arrived in Europe in the recent years and 
explains their illegal and often dangerous attempts to reach Europe. These dangerous journeys 
have resulted in 7,927 migrants dying or going missing in 2016, up from 6,281 migrants in 2015. 
More than 60 percent of these deaths and missing migrants are attributed to the Mediterranean 
Sea (McAuliffe and Ruhs, 2018).  
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b. The European Immigration Crisis  
In 2015, Germany became the “largest single recipient of first-time asylum claims 
globally, with 441,899 new requests” (Global migration trends factsheet, 2015). Germany was 
followed by the United States, Sweden, and the Russian Federation in number of new asylum 
requests. In 2015, the European Union received approximately 1.3 million asylum claims, 
doubling the number of claims received in 2014. Following Germany, the countries that received 
the most claims were Hungary, Sweden, Austria, Italy, and France (Global migration trends 
factsheet, 2015). This high number of asylum claims is extremely difficult for European 
countries to handle, and asylum-seekers often move from country to country before their claims 
can be processed, which is a problem that will be discussed in the following literature review.  
 According to Cummings, Pacitto, and Foresti (2015), “during 2014 and 2015, there has 
been an exponential increase in the number of irregular migrants entering Europe.” “Irregular 
migrants” refers to those people residing in a country who do not have that country’s legal 
permission to be living there, while “irregular migration” refers to the “cross-border flow” of 
people who enter a country without that country’s permission to do so (Cummings, Pacitto, and 
Foresti, p. 9, 2015).  
In order for many immigrants to reach Europe, irregular migration routes formed between 
2010 and 2015. Three main pathways have been identified: the Western Balkans Route, the 
Eastern Mediterranean Route, and the Central Mediterranean Route. The Western Balkans route 
accounts for both the flow of migrants from the Western Balkans countries and for the flow of 
Asian migrants moving from Bulgaria, Turkey, or Greece to Hungary. The Eastern 
Mediterranean Route accounts for the flow of migrants passing through Turkey en route to the 
European Union, using Greece, southern Bulgaria, or Cyprus. The Central Mediterranean Route 
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accounts for the flow of migrants from North Africa to Italy and Malta using the Mediterranean 
Sea. This was the primary route for irregular migration to the EU in 2011, 2013, and 2014, and 
remains heavily-used today (Cummings, Pacitto, and Foresti, p. 10,18, 2015).  
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c. Italy at the Forefront 
Italy— often thought of in relation to its cuisine, rolling hills lined with vineyards, ocean 
vistas, and historic ruins— is a country on the front lines of one of Europe’s most pressing 
problems: the immigration crisis. The country’s location at the southern border of Europe on the 
Mediterranean Sea puts 
Italy in extremely close 
proximity to the northern 
coast of Africa, resulting in 
its position at the forefront 
of the immigration crisis 
and causing it to feel the brunt of the waves of African and Middle Eastern immigrants who have 
been pouring in from the sea since 2014. With a population of 62,137,802 people in July of 2017 
and a population density of about 205 people per square kilometer, Italy is more crowded than 
most European countries, causing it to feel the pressing weight of the hundreds of thousands of 
immigrants entering the country each year (Italy: population density from 2007 to 2017, 2018, 
and The World Factbook: Italy, 2018). 
In 2015, the official beginning of what is deemed ‘the immigration crisis’, “a total of 
153,842 people arrived by sea to Italy, a decrease from 170,000 in 2014, yet still a large increase 
compared to the 42,925 arrivals recorded by national authorities in 2013” (Global Migration 
Trends Factsheet, 2017). Most immigrants who travel by sea to Italy are African citizens, most 
prominently Eritrean and Nigerian in 2015, and smaller percentage of the total immigrants came 
from the Syrian Arab Republic (Global Migration Trends Factsheet, 2017). In 2018, the largest 
percentages of immigrants who arrived by sea in Italy hailed from Tunisia and Eritrea. 
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Approximately 80 to 90 percent of the migrants traveling to Italy depart by way of Libya and use 
the Central Mediterranean Route of irregular migration, in which migrants and asylum seekers 
depart from North Africa, cross the Mediterranean Sea by boat— often with the help of illegal 
smuggling systems— and arrive in Italy, Malta, or nearby islands such as the Italian islands of 
Lampedusa and Linosa, located halfway between Malta and the coast of Tunisia (Cummings, 
Pacitto, and Foresti, 2015). In 2016, Italy saw 180,000 migrant arrivals, which dropped to 
119,000 in 2017 (Migration to Europe in charts, 2018). On January first, 2018, Italy had the third 
highest number of non-EU nationals living in its country at 5.1 million, preceded only by 
Germany and the United Kingdom (Migration and migrant population statistics, 2019).  
Faced with the challenge of controlling borders with the sea, Italy is presented with 
challenges that are different and more difficult to control than those of land borders. Northern 
African countries such as Libya lack the control over its borders to regulate the illegal smugglers 
who set sail for Italy every day, and the newly-formed European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency does not yet have the manpower and necessary skills to overcome every vessel 
attempting to access Italy through the Central Mediterranean Route. The stricter enforcing of 
controls over other irregular migration routes of access to Europe— such as the route through 
Turkey— has put further strain on the situation, forcing desperate migrants and asylum-seekers 
to use the Central Mediterranean Route, thus overwhelming Italy (Hermanin, 2017). 
As Italy struggles to deal with the crisis to the best of its abilities, tensions have arisen 
between Italy and the European Union, and “government and public opinion alike feel that Italy 
has done its part in dealing with the persistent crisis, while the EU has shown a deplorable lack 
of solidarity” (Hermanin, 2017). In June of 2018, Italy’s interior minister Matteo Salvini 
declared, upon visiting the town of Pozzallo in Sicily— a “migration hotspot”— that “Italy and 
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Sicily cannot be Europe’s refugee camp” (Carrier, 2018). In light of the immigration crisis and 
the growing tensions between Italy and the European Union, analyzing the problems faced by 
Italy prior to the rise in immigration may illuminate the reasons for the country’s current crisis 
situation. 
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Literature Review 
a. The First Crisis- The Economic Crisis of 2008 and the ECB’s Response 
The immigration crisis in Europe, and, specifically, in Italy, is not a crisis in and of itself. 
The increase in immigration in 2014 resulted in full-blown crisis as a result of the coinciding of 
multiple pre-existing crises and their effects on Italy. One pre-existing problem is the Italian 
recession in 2008 and the weak economy even prior to the recession. The already weak Italian 
economy was extremely susceptible to the worldwide economic crisis in 2008. In the wake of the 
crisis, the European Central Bank proved that its interests were skewed in the direction of richer 
countries such as Germany and France, and the European Union failed to bail out Italy and help 
the country get back on its feet. These problems created a climate in which the effects of the 
immigration crisis could grow and worsen, and they provide a background for Italy’s 
continuously growing dissatisfaction with the European Union.  
Even before the crash, Italy had a weaker economy than most Eurozone countries. Over 
the decade before the 2008 crisis, Italy’s annual growth was “almost one percentage point lower 
than the average” of its peer countries (Morsy and Sgherri, 2010). This low growth rate was due 
largely in part to a poor total factor productivity which decreased sharply from 1995 to 2005, 
primarily in the manufacturing and non-tradable sectors of Italy’s economy (Morsy and Sgherri, 
2010). Prodi’s leftist governmental employment policies were focused on expansion of 
temporary positions, which resulted in low wages and few rights for workers. This reduced 
“long-term family investment in houses, and savings, and discouraged marriage and child-
bearing” (Di Quirico, 2010). The poor economy also pushed the government to cut the budgets 
for education and some welfare and health care service. The decrease in services for the Italian 
people increased animosity toward the government— which collapsed in 2008 allowing 
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Berlusconi to regain power— and also increased the inequalities between the northern and 
southern regions of the country. The economic crisis further weakened southern Italy and Sicily, 
making it especially susceptible to the problems brought about later by the immigration crisis 
and poorly equipped to deal with the crisis effectively (Di Quirico, 2010).  
The economic and social problems in Italy were made worse with the economic crisis. 
When the global recession began in 2008, Italy was not immediately affected. The crash initially 
affected big banks, of which Italy does not have many, and the state was able to solve the early 
problems faced by the banks. Italy officially joined the international crisis when banks began to 
reduce the credit of its clients in an attempt to recover liquidity. The larger problem came from 
the links of certain small and medium-sized Italian banks with Central and Eastern European 
countries which lost share value and risked complete collapse. This resulted in the banks 
“reducing credit to clients and consumers and raising the amount of collateral required for new 
loans,” which then reduced investments in machinery and houses, caused the unemployment rate 
to grow, caused the GDP to decrease, and increased budget deficits and public debt (Di Quirico, 
2010). 
 In an attempt to get the crisis under control, the European Central Bank— in its Troika 
partnership with the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund— implemented 
an austerity policy in an attempt to cut government spending, conserve resources, and get the 
debt under control. However, the countries that underwent this austerity policy— which has 
since been discredited— have ended up with increased debt and shrunken GDPs. The Troika 
believed that this policy would expand the economy, but it had the opposite effect and increased 
the debt/GDP ratios instead. According to Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Laureate and former chairman 
of the Council of Economic Advisors under President Bill Clinton, it is the “design of the 
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eurozone itself” that is to blame for the fact that, a decade later, some European countries have 
yet to recover from the economic crisis (Stiglitz, 2016). First off, the membership in the EU itself 
poses problems when a country needs to improve its economy. These countries do not have 
control of their own currency as members of the euro, and therefore do not have to freedom to 
lower interest rates, spend more, or have a devaluation. They cannot take matters into their own 
hands and must follow the ECB policies. So, in structuring the economic system of the European 
Union, the EU and the ECB chose to (1) focus on inflation, and (2) take away the fiscal tool, the 
interest rate tool, and the exchange rate tool from member countries (Stiglitz, 2019). As a result 
of implementing economic policies that could not sustain individual countries in times of 
recession, countries like Italy remain in crisis a decade after the worldwide economic crisis. 
The Italian economy took a large hit from the crisis, which resulted in the disillusionment 
with the Italian government and the European Union. In general, Italian companies suffered 
worsened revenues, especially in “more export-oriented branches of manufacturing industries” 
(Coletto, 2010). The Italian production system is comprised primarily of small companies, which 
make up 95% of all enterprises in the country and provide 50% of jobs to the country’s workers. 
Due to the procedures enacted by the ECB in response to the recession, small business in Italy 
found themselves with “lower access to credit” and “fewer resources available to undertake 
reorganization,” as well as less demand from large enterprises to which they were suppliers 
(Coletto, 2010). This resulted in an increase in unemployment in Italy, with 380,000 people 
losing their jobs. Unemployment was higher in southern Italy, and the unemployment rate 
continued to grow in the years after the recession began, rising from 6.7% in 2008 to 7.8% in 
2009 to 8.5% in 2010 (Coletto, 2010). The people most affected by unemployment during the 
Salachi 17 
 
recession—and still today— were temporary workers and young people, many of whom are 
students who are unable to find work after graduating from universities.  
The economic instability in Italy led to a rise in opposition to Berlusconi’s government 
and accusations of corruption and insufficiency. It led to increased criminal activity throughout 
the country, much of which is blamed on immigrants. Though the current immigration crisis did 
not officially begin until 2015, both legal and illegal immigrants have always been present in 
Italy. The recession led to an increase in anti-immigrant sentiment among native Italian people, 
which has continued to increase in the recent years (Di Quirico, 2010). The combination of high 
unemployment rates, animosity toward Italy’s government, and anti-immigrant sentiment 
provide a hostile environment for immigrants. Native Italian people do not want them there and 
want to limit competition for the few jobs that are available.  
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b. The Second Crisis- European Union Immigration Policy 
 The second pre-existing crisis in Italy was the downfall of the immigration policies of the 
EU, specifically the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation. The problems caused by 
the economic crisis of 2008 and the resulting actions of the European Central Bank and the 
European Union created a background of animosity between Italy and the European Union that 
paved the way for the problems that have stemmed from EU immigration and asylum policies. 
The Schengen Agreement, enacted in 1985, is a European Union policy that allows every 
European Union citizen to travel, work, and live in any Schengen area country. It also guarantees 
free movement between Schengen area countries to EU citizens as well as tourists and other non-
EU citizens— including the immigrants and refugees entering Europe illegally. In addition, the 
Schengen deems the countries with external borders responsible for patrolling those borders (The 
Schengen acquis, 1985). Today, the Schengen 
area includes most EU countries— with the 
exception of Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, 
Romania, and the United Kingdom— as well as 
the non-EU countries of Iceland, Norway, 
Switzerland, and Liechtenstein. Any person or 
vehicle may cross the internal borders between 
the member countries without being subject to 
border checks (Schengen Area, 2018). This free and easy movement between member states has 
had meaningful impacts on tourism, trade, and immigration, which will be discussed further in 
the following sections.    
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With respect to the immigration crisis and the influx of migrants and refugees arriving in 
the European Union, the Schengen Agreement has become controversial, as it was not 
formulated with a foreign immigration crisis in mind. The original Schengen Agreement, 
implemented in European Union law in 1985, states that, although the internal borders of the 
Schengen Area are open to all without restrictions, the external borders of the area may “only be 
crossed at border crossing points and during the fixed opening hours” (The Schengen acquis, 
1985, Article 3.1). These designated border crossing points include airports, ocean ports, and 
other border checkpoints in which all people who wish to enter that country— and thus the 
Schengen Area as a whole— must have their credentials verified and be given permission to 
enter. The following article of the Schengen Agreement states that the member states with 
external borders “undertake to introduce penalties for the unauthorized crossing of external 
borders,” meaning that these countries are responsible for monitoring all irregular border 
crossings into their country and thus controlling both the authorized and unauthorized external 
border crossing areas (The Schengen acquis, 1985, Article 3.2). For many countries with external 
borders, this is a massive area that must always be regulated and monitored. This is especially 
relevant to the current immigration crisis, because many unauthorized border crossings occur or 
are attempted daily along the external borders of Schengen area countries, most prominently 
Italy and Greece.   
At the beginning of this immigration crisis, the problem of patrolling the external borders 
was the most pressing issue, with the member states leaving the countries with these borders to 
fend for themselves. Today, immigrants continue to enter the southernmost countries via the 
Mediterranean Sea, but the European Union has made great progress in aiding these countries.  
In 2016, a European Parliament regulation regarding the Schengen Borders Code states in Article 
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6 that “Border control is in the interest not only of the Member State at whose external borders it 
is carried out but of all Member States which have abolished internal border control” (Regulation 
(EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament, 2016, Article 6). This is a step in the right direction 
for the Schengen Agreement, which originally stated that member states with external borders 
were solely responsible for their own borders. Another positive yet insufficient step forward for 
the European Union in response to the immigration crisis and acknowledgment that the 
Schengen area must work together to patrol the external borders is the formation of the European 
Border and Coastal Guard Agency, or the EBCG. This agency was launched in October of 2016, 
and is a reform of the Frontex agency, the former EU border protection agency. While Frontex 
provided only monetary aid and direction to the border patrol forces of Schengen member states, 
the EBCG also deploys border guards to border areas that are in need of reinforcement. 
However, it is a new program and is in the development process, meaning it has not yet made 
any great contributions to solving the immigration crisis. The Agency provides physical aid to 
the existing border controls as well as providing its own equipment, and also gives direction to 
the existing border controls of the member states (Securing Europe’s External Borders, 2017). 
The EBCG works with the member states in order to better enforce the external borders but does 
not have unlimited power as to not interfere with “state-centered matters such as sovereignty, 
fundamental rights or trade” (Rojo, 2017). The European Border and Coastal Guard Agency has 
the potential to be very beneficial to the European Union as it continues to develop and improve. 
These new developments take into account the severity of the immigration crisis and the 
necessity for all member states to work together to protect the European Union and control the 
crisis. 
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As the European Union began to increase focus on external border protection of the 
Schengen area and work together to enforce these borders, the main problem shifted to the 
internal borders. When the internal borders of the Schengen area are open, immigrants and 
refugees often move from their country of first arrival to other countries before their asylum 
claims and other documentation can be processed, which increases the difficulty of recording and 
monitoring who has arrived in the EU. According to another aspect of European Union 
immigration policy called the Dublin Regulation, countries that receive asylum applications have 
the right to send those filing the applications back to their country of first arrival in the European 
Union. The countries of first arrival for these asylum-seekers are primarily countries with 
southern external borders such as Italy and Greece (Explaining the rules for migrants: borders 
and asylum, 2015). In 2015, the beginning of the immigration crisis, Germany became the 
“largest single recipient of first-time asylum claims globally, with 441,899 new requests” 
(Global migration trends factsheet, 2015). Following Germany, the countries that received the 
most claims were Hungary, Sweden, Austria, Italy, and France (Global migration trends 
factsheet, 2015). The high number of asylum claims being received during this immigration 
crisis is extremely difficult for European countries to handle, and asylum-seekers often move 
from country to country before their claims can be processed, using the open internal borders 
implemented by the Schengen Agreement. As countries with better economies and more job 
opportunities— primarily Germany and France— fall under the burden of hundreds of thousands 
of asylum applications filed by immigrants and refugees who illegally entered the Schengen area 
through the external borders, these countries become increasingly willing to send the asylum-
seekers back to the already struggling Schengen area external border countries. 
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Taking this a step further, many countries have begun to block immigrants and refugees 
from entering their countries altogether. Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Sweden, 
Denmark, and Belgium 
reintroduced internal border 
controls after September of 
2015 because they believed 
the large number of migrants 
attempting to move into their 
countries posed threats to 
public policy or security and because they believed the external border management of Italy and 
Greece was extremely deficient (Guild et al, 2016). Though the Schengen Agreement allows for 
the temporary reintroduction of internal border checks where deficiencies are detected at the 
external borders and when member states believe that they are threatened, the act of 
reintroducing internal border checks further alienates the struggling countries, trapping the 
crowds that arrive on the coasts daily inside the countries that lack resources to process and 
accommodate them (Schengen acquis, 1985, Article 2). An incident of a temporary closing of 
internal borders came even before the current immigration crisis began and is referred to is the 
Franco-Italian Affair of 2011, in which France temporarily imposed border checks at border with 
Italy in order to block a train carrying Tunisian immigrants from entering the country (Guild et 
al, 2016). Following this incident, the European Parliament gathered in 2012 in order to propose 
regulations on the reintroduction of internal border checks in the Schengen area. In the many 
amendments proposed in this meeting, the Parliament argued that “migration and the crossing of 
external borders by a large number of third-country nationals should not, per se, be considered to 
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be a threat to public policy or to internal security,” the free movement of persons should not be 
hindered, internal borders should not be closed for political reasons, internal borders checks 
should not be imposed for more than thirty days, and other measures should be taken, if possible, 
to resolve any problems before resorting to the closing of internal borders (On the proposal for a 
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 
562/2006, 2012). Despite the concerns expressed in this 2012 Parliament hearing— which led to 
a 2013 reform of the Schengen Agreement in which the proposals listed above were enacted— 
the countries previously listed chose to reintroduce internal border checks at the height of the 
immigration crisis. This has worsened the problems faced by countries such as Italy and Greece, 
which battle overcrowding and the inability to accommodate the immigrants and refugees 
seeking new lives in Europe.  
In the 2018 “annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area” by the European 
Parliament, Parliament “condemns the continued reintroduction of internal border checks as this 
undermines the basic principles of the Schengen area,” and “takes the view that many of the 
prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or 
proportionality and are therefore unlawful.” (European Parliament resolution of 30 May 2018 on 
the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area, 2018). The report proceeds to 
highlight that member states have been “artificially changing the legal basis for reintroduction to 
extend it beyond the maximum possible period,” and that there are other tools at the disposal of 
these countries, including “targeted police controls” that should be utilized before border 
controls, and that the continuation of internal border controls “would impose major economic 
costs on the EU as a whole” (European Parliament resolution of 30 May 2018 on the annual 
report on the functioning of the Schengen area, 2018). It is clear that the reintroduction of 
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internal border controls is detrimental to the Schengen area and is increasing the pressure already 
felt by the countries at the frontlines of the immigration crisis. However, the Schengen 
Agreement still holds that it is legal, and member states are reluctant to remove the border 
checks.  
Despite what seems to be a progressive movement toward trust and teamwork between 
Schengen member states by way of the formation of the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency, some countries continue to call for closed internal borders, pushing for the 
reintroduction of internal border checks in order to protect themselves and push back against the 
immigrants and asylum seekers from entering their countries. These downfalls of European 
Union immigration policy, specifically the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation, 
prove to be a reason for the crisis created by the rise in immigration to Europe in the recent 
years. The lack of willingness for EU member countries to work to ease the burden on Italy and 
other countries of first arrival has alienated Italy from the European Union and created a climate 
of selfishness and self-serving interests. However, this climate found its beginnings some years 
prior to 2015.  
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c. The Third Crisis- Italy’s Unstable Government and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment 
 With the recent formation and growth of political parties preaching anti-immigration to 
riots in the streets of Italian cities, it is clear that the whole country is feeling the dividing effects 
of the crisis and calling for change. Italy has a history of government instability, with one of its 
most infamous leaders being the fascist Mussolini. Berlusconi, in addition, who served as Italy’s 
Prime Minister in four different governments, was extremely controversial and the subject of 
numerous scandals during his time in power. The pre-existing problems with the Italian economy 
and European Union immigration policies that have been exacerbated by the increase in 
immigration have sparked a third problem that has led to the immigration “crisis”: new radical 
and anti-immigrant political parties.  
 In 2013, the radical populist Five Star party participated in its first national election, 
where it received only 25 percent of the total votes. In the election that took place in March 
2018, it received the most votes at 33 percent. The party, led by Luigi Di Maio, has quickly 
gained the favor of the Italian public who believes that Berlusconi’s government has not done 
enough in recent years to help Italy recover from the economic crash, lower the unemployment 
rate, and improve the lives the Italian people (Loucaides, 2018). The Five Star party aims to 
implement a basic equal income for all people and an end to poverty and is often referred to by 
the media as “anti-establishment, anti-EU and anti-immigration,” though it does not explicitly 
refer to itself in this way (Loucaides, 2018). Five Star is especially popular in the southern 
regions of Italy, which is the most poverty-stricken and the most affected by the immigration 
crisis. The southern Italian and Sicilian people who are struggling with poverty and the overflow 
of immigrants are more likely to support a radical party who pledges to make the changes the 
people want.  
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 The publicized basis of Five Star’s platform is greater equality and quality of life for all 
Italian people, though it does have radical undertones. Even more radical than Five Star is the 
far-right Lega Nord party, often referred to as “Lega”, which is creating a sharp divide between 
Italians. Lega, led by Matteo Salvini, is part of a right-wing alliance with the former prime 
minister Silvio Berlusconi, and his Forza Italia party. The Lega’s platform is autonomy for the 
regions of northern Italy, based in the resentment of some northern Italians toward southern 
Italians, Rome, and the European Union. The party has preached “Euroscepticism” in the recent 
years, openly criticizing the euro (Schumacher, 2018). Lega is also known for its extreme anti-
immigrant sentiment and staunch opposition to immigration, even going as far to suggest that 
Milan designate certain train cars for use by Milanese people only (Schumacher, 2018). One of 
Lega’s anti-immigrant claims is that immigrants and refugees are given special benefits in Italy 
and are thus exploiting the native Italian people (Dixon et al, 2018). This is a sensitive topic for 
the Italian people, who struggle to find jobs, housing, and welfare benefits. The idea that 
immigrants and refugees are further depriving them of these necessities makes them further 
inclined toward anti-immigrant sentiment themselves.  
The rise to power and popularity by Salvini’s Lega and Di Maio’s Five Star reveal that 
many Italian people are staunchly opposed to immigration and want to return Italy to the state of 
autonomy that it had before it joined the European Union. In recent news, Italy has also been 
openly criticizing what they believe to be the European Union’s failure to assist in the control of 
the immigration crisis. Italy is feeling increasingly abandoned by the European Union, even 
going as far as to threaten to veto a budget proposed by the EU to assist with control of the 
migration crisis. The proposed plan would set forth a budget for the next seven years, but Di 
Maio and Salvini will refuse to accept it if the European Union will not take on more migrants 
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and relieve the burden on Italy. Salvini has even threatened to stop Italy’s funding to the 
European Union annual budget, which is required for member states, and has called the EU 
“filth” (Gotev, 2018). Salvini and Di Maio are often referred to as “Italy’s strongmen,” and have 
even more influence over the Italian people and the government than Prime Minister Giuseppe 
Conte himself (Gotev, 2018). With their parties continuing to grow in popularity and their anti-
immigration and anti-EU sentiments becoming more widespread, the future of Italy as a part of 
the European Union is becoming increasingly questioned.  
The suffering economy and radical political parties combined with the increasing 
tensions of the continuing immigration crisis are causing the Italian people to view their own 
country in a negative light. A 2018 poll from the More in Common initiative revealed many of 
the feelings of Italian people toward the current state of the country and the problems it is facing. 
According to this poll, 53 percent of Italian people stated that they believe “that ‘weak’ is an 
accurate description of Italy, followed by ‘angry’ and ‘divided’” (Dixon et al, 2018). Only five 
percent of Italian people would describe Italy using only positive terms. In addition to viewing 
the state of Italy in a primarily negative light, the majority of Italian people also view 
globalization negatively and believe it to the reason for many problems that Italy faces today, 
with 55 percent of Italian people believing that “globalization has had negative economic 
consequences” (Dixon et al, 2018). In addition, the majority of Italians believe that Italy must 
protect itself more from the rest of the world, especially its culture and heritage. This is in line 
with the beliefs of the radical political parties rapidly gaining power in Italy who want to keep 
the immigrants and refugees out and return Italy to its Italian nationality and do more to benefit 
ethnically Italian people. Most Italian people across the country believe that the European Union 
needs to do more to assist Italy in its management of the immigration crisis, though the southern 
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regions of the country are more uncertain if remaining in the European Union is the right choice. 
However, 52 percent of the country expressed support for Italy’s continuing membership in the 
European Union. The country’s “tension between frustration and disenchantment with the EU 
and a simultaneous desire to remain a part of the union” has created a state of confusion and 
uncertainty in Italy (Dixon et al, 2018). The Italian people are unsure of what they want, 
although they seem to agree that some changes need to be made if the country’s economic 
problems and immigration crisis problems are to be solved. This climate of uncertainty has made 
the influence of Lega and Five Star incredibly strong, as the Italian people look for answers.  
The More in Common poll also conducted studies on how Italian people understand their 
Italian identity and the extent to which the feel their identity is threatened by immigrants. Many 
Italian people see migrants as outsiders who threaten the identity of native Italian people and 
even cause some native Italians to leave the country. The Italian people also believe that the 
immigration crisis would not have such a drastic impact on Italy if the country had been stronger 
to begin with. The poor economy, unemployment, lack of basic services, poverty, and divide 
between the societies and economies of the north and south have left the Italian people feeling 
the effects of the crisis even more (Dixon et al, 2018).  
Problems originating even before the immigration crisis have given rise to strong anti-
immigration sentiments felt by the Italian people and preached by the radical political parties 
Lega Nord and Five Star, and the increase in immigration has allowed these radical parties and 
xenophobic attitudes to flourish in Italy. It has also opened a new door in the minds of the Italian 
people, which is the possibility of succession from the European Union. Though the majority of 
the Italian people do not support Italy leaving the European Union, the increasing pressure of the 
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parties on the EU to do more to help Italy is creating a climate of uncertainty in the country. As 
the immigration crisis continues, tensions increase.  
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d. Repercussions of the Pre-Existing Crises 
The 2008 economic crisis and the policies of the ECB, the problems created by the 
Schengen agreement, and the government and social structure of Italy provided a perfect climate 
for the increase in immigration in 2014 to spark a crisis situation. This poses the problem: what 
should Italy do now? Despite the problems faced in the aftermath of the recession, Italy’s 
economy has been given opportunities for growth by the open borders of the Schengen area. The 
removal of these benefits would negatively impact the economy of Italy, thus increasing the 
effects of the immigration crisis even further.  
The open borders provided for by the Schengen Agreement allow for the movement of 
not only people, but of goods and workers. Every year, the internal borders of the European 
Union are crossed approximately 1.3 billion times by people (Putting up barriers; Schengen’s 
economic impact, 2016). Because there are not permanent border controls in place at the border 
of Italy, there is no conclusive data on the percentage of Italian laborers who cross the internal 
borders of Italy each day to work in other Schengen area countries. However, the expansion of 
the labor market that is provided by the open borders is important to the citizens of Italy. With a 
high unemployment rate of 10.7% in August of 2018, Italy struggles to provide jobs to all of its 
citizens (Labour market: second quarter of 2018, 2018). The open borders of the Schengen 
alleviate some of the stress on Italy by allowing the citizens to easily cross borders to work in 
other countries. Reintroduction of border controls would not only diminish the jobs available to 
Italians— primarily those who live in Northern Italy in close proximity to Italy’s internal 
border— but would also make it much more difficult for those who already hold jobs in other 
countries to travel to and from work each day (Putting up barriers; Schengen’s economic impact, 
2016).  
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With the reintroduction of border checks comes long lines of cars waiting at border 
checkpoints for their passengers’ passports to be checked. Though this is mostly a nuisance, 
border checks can bring about more serious problems. In addition to the border crossings of 
people, the internal borders of the Schengen area are crossed each year by about 57 million times 
by trucks carrying €2.8 trillion of goods. Borderless trade in the EU allows goods to be 
transported easily and quickly between Schengen area countries and saves time and money, and 
forcing trucks to stop at internal border checks and wait in long lines to be searched would cause 
an extreme loss of both. The more internal borders a trade route includes, the more money will 
be saved, for example, “a truck from Italy to Germany crosses two internal borders so that 
Schengen is equivalent to a trade cost saving of about 1.4%,” but border checks could put an end 
to these savings (Felbermayr et al, 2016). 
 The end of the open borders of the Schengen would bring about more serious problems 
as well, such as interrupting the single market of the European Union, which could result in a 3% 
tax on trade between countries in the Schengen area and a reduction in output of 0.8% 
(amounting to €110 billion) over the next ten years, raising prices of goods and services for 
European Union citizens (Putting up barriers; Schengen’s economic impact, 2016). Italy is the 
seventh largest export economy in the world and the third largest in Europe, and a hinderance to 
the country’s ability to efficiently export goods could cause problems. Among Italy’s top export 
destinations are Germany and France, to which products can easily be exported by land by 
crossing the internal borders of the Schengen area (Italy country profile, 2018). The industries 
that would be most affected by the long-term reintroduction of border controls would be those of 
perishable foodstuffs, produce, and animal products. The long waits at borders will put 
perishable goods in danger of spoiling, and companies may need to spend extra money to rent 
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storage areas or upgrade their transportation (Putting up barriers; Schengen’s economic impact, 
2016). About 5.6% of Italy’s exported goods are foodstuffs, and the exports amounted to 25.3 
billion USD in 2016 (Italy country profile, 2018). A blow to the efficiency of this export 
business within the European Union could result in a substantial loss for Italy.  
Since temporary border checks were reinstated beginning in 2015, some loss has been 
seen in the GDP of Schengen area countries, and even greater decline is predicted. Since 2015, a 
decline of 0.13% of GDP has been seen in Italy, and a decline of 0.35% of GDP is predicted if 
border controls are reintroduced at all internal borders (Felbermayr et al, 2016). According to the 
VOX Centre for Economic Policy Research, “peripheral and/or small countries are much more 
strongly affected than central and/or large ones,” meaning that a permanent reintroduction of 
border controls at all Schengen internal borders could put Italy at a higher risk than other 
countries for economic loss (Felbermayr et al, 2016). Because some negative results of 
temporary border checks have already been detected, the continuation and expansion of these 
border checks is predicted to be detrimental and hinder the trade and labor industries in Italy and 
other Schengen member countries.  
Though it would seemingly be detrimental for Italy to withdraw from the Schengen 
Agreement or from the European Union, it is clear that the European Union and its policies have 
had negative effects on Italy in the recent years.  
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What Does This Reveal About Globalization? 
The previous discussion of the problems that have befallen Italy begs the question: What 
can we make of this? What is the underlying problem? Many of the issues Italy has faced have 
been directly related to Italy’s membership in the European Union, which is a sort of miniature 
globalization. So, this situation reveals that globalization— which refers to the interdependence 
of national economies and the cross-border trade of goods and services— is not always 
beneficial to the countries involved. In some cases, one solution will not work to solve the 
problems of all countries in a globalized society.  
 In his 2011 book, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World 
Economy, economist Dani Rodrik hypothesizes that globalization proposes a trilemma. That is, 
in the world economy, democracy, national determination, and economic globalization cannot 
coexist (Rodrik, 2011). The first option, democracy, is the form of politics in which elected 
representatives represent the entirety of its population. The second option, national 
determination, is the ability for nations to be distinct from other nations and exercise self-
determination. The third option, economic globalization, is the interdependence of national 
economies and movement of goods and services across borders. According to Rodrik, a country 
can choose two of these options, but it cannot have all three. For example, if globalization is 
chosen as one aspect that must exist, either democracy or national determination must be 
abandoned. Rodrik argues that all three factors cannot exist in harmony because globalization 
ignores the inherent differences between nations. It is impossible for every single nation to have 
its needs and interests met by a set of global rules and practices. Therefore, something must be 
sacrificed (Rodrik, 2011).  
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According to Rodrik, democracy and national determination are the most important 
choices, and these should be chosen above globalization (Roderick, 2011). He gives a reason for 
this, stating, “Democracies have the right to protect their social arrangements, and when this 
right clashes with the requirements of the global economy, it is the latter that should give way” 
(Rodrick, 2011). This does not call for an end to globalization, but instead for a better 
globalization that does not impair or block the abilities of national governments to make their 
own decisions for the well-being of their own societies. Rodrik describes this new and improved 
globalization as “a thin layer of international rules” that does not suffocate national governments 
and allows them to maintain the economic benefits of globalization while also preserving their 
national interests (Rodrik, 2011).  
In the case of Italy, the globalized migration and economic policies of the European 
Union during the economic crisis of 2008 and the current immigration crisis blocked Italy’s 
ability to exercise national determination. In 2008, the European Union and the European Central 
Bank blocked the ability of Italy to choose its own course of action to repair its economy. 
Ultimately, the choices of the European Central Bank to utilize an austerity policy failed to solve 
Italy’s economic problems, and the economy of Italy remains weak and unstable to this day. This 
complete control by the European Central Bank did not leave Italy with any ability to determine 
what its course of action would be. It is impossible to tell if Italy would be better or worse off if 
it had been able to make its own decisions during the crisis, but it should have had the ability to 
protect its own country and economy.  
Today, the European Union’s Schengen Agreement provides another example of 
Rodrik’s trilemma at work. This policy encompasses the majority of European Union member 
countries but does not always allow each country to function in the same way. When immigrants 
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began to pour in to Italy through its external borders, other member countries began to close their 
borders and leave Italy to fend for itself. Though this policy allowed these countries to act in 
their best interest, it ultimately led to the abandonment of Italy. This is an interesting situation, 
because the Schengen Agreement allows countries to have national determination in some 
situations, but often at the expense of another nation with which they should be working in 
partnership. In this case, Italy could not take any emergency measures to change the Schengen 
Agreement to help its situation. It struggled to patrol its external borders with limited help from 
the European Union amidst the border-closings by other countries. This situation and that of the 
economic crisis of 2008 show that because Italy has a democratic government and is a member 
state of the European Union, Italy has chosen democracy and a globalized economy, leaving out 
national determination. Great Britain, when it found itself encountering its own problems with 
the European Union, voted to abandon globalization and choose democracy and national 
determination. Though Italy’s membership in the Schengen Agreement and the European Union 
has been detrimental to the country in recent years, it benefits Italy’s economy. A Brexit-like exit 
would leave the already-struggling country in a worsened state. This is a situation in which 
Rodrik’s call for a thin layer of globalization would benefit Italy, allowing it to reap the benefits 
of a globalized economy while giving it the ability to defend and protect itself in crisis situations.  
Despite these examples of Rodrik’s trilemma, economist Thomas Palley argues that this 
trilemma is a fallacy, and in reality, there is only a dilemma between “more globalization and 
reduced national policy space” (Palley, 2017). Palley agrees with Rodrik in the sense that 
globalization poses threats to a nation’s ability to make its own policies and to policy space, but 
disagrees that democracy is affected by globalization. Globalization affects what democracy can 
accomplish, but it does not affect the democracy itself. In addition, there are different types of 
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globalization that can affect policy space differently, either shrinking it or expanding it (Palley, 
2017). Palley’s theory, however, is insufficient to Rodrik’s theory because globalization destroys 
the ability for the citizens of countries to vote on certain policies. In Italy in 2008, the Italian 
people did not vote that the European Central Bank should enact an austerity policy on the 
country. 
Globalization can also create a negative environment if all countries are not treated as 
equals. The European Union, marketed by its central government as a true “union” of member 
countries, does not always act in a unified manor. In the aftermath of the global economic crisis 
of 2008, some northern European countries such as Germany took to blaming the victims of the 
crisis such as Italy and Greece, who had “suffered as a result of flawed policies and the flawed 
structure of the eurozone” (Stiglitz, 2016). Instead of doing more or attempting different policies 
to assist the victim countries, some European Union countries simply turned against them, 
blaming them for the problems of the EU. In reality, these victim countries, unable to enact their 
own policies or control their currency could not have done anything to help themselves. Stiglitz 
argues that the problems of the Eurozone are deeply embedded in the zone’s structural features. 
By taking away individual countries abilities to control their own economies, these countries 
become sitting ducks, waiting for the EU and the ECB to make a move.  
European Union member countries are negatively affected by the Eurozone’s form of 
globalization. Italy is a prime example of a country that the centralized government and bank of 
the European Union failed in its time economic crisis and continues to fail today. Globalization, 
though seemingly beneficial, can be the seed from which crisis grows. Rodrik’s trilemma 
describes how crisis situations like this one arise, and his call for a new globalization that is less 
restrictive on national self-determination may be the solution to future similar problems.  
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Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, what is deemed the “immigration crisis” in Italy is not a crisis in and of 
itself. The situation that Italy now faces is the result of numerous pre-existing problems that have 
converged with each other and with the recent rise in immigration to create a new crisis situation. 
The web of pre-existing problems— the economic crisis of 2008, the faults of the Schengen 
Agreement and Dublin Regulations, and the rise of radical political parties— is connected by 
anti-immigration sentiments and feelings of disillusionment for and abandonment by the 
European Union arising from the failing of the globalized Eurozone to support its member 
country. The economic and social problems that have been present in Italy for decades— such as 
unemployment and anti-immigrant sentiment— were worsened by the pre-existing problems in 
the country and are further worsened by the increase in immigration.  
With the radical political parties going as far as to threaten secession from the European 
Union, Italy could be facing even greater problems if the country does not begin to receive the 
help and support it so desperately needs. It is time for the European Union powers to take 
responsibility for some of the problems that Italy faces today, reevaluate the globalized 
constructs of the Eurozone, and attempt to gain control of the immigration situation for the good 
of the entire Union.  
  
Salachi 38 
 
Works Cited 
Carrier, Fanny. (2018). Italy cannot be 'Europe's refugee camp': Matteo Salvini. Retrieved from 
https://www.thelocal.it/20180604/salvini-in-sicily-to-push-new-tough-migration-line 
 
Coletto, Diego. (2010). Effects of economic crisis on Italian economy. Retrieved from 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/article/2010/effects-of-economic-crisis-
on-italian-economy 
 
Collett, Elizabeth. (2011). Faltering movement: explaining Europe’s Schengen struggle. 
Retrieved from https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/faltering-movement-explaining-
europes-schengen-struggle 
 
Cummings, C., Pacitto, J., Lauro, D., & Foresti, M. (2015). Why people move: understanding the 
drivers and trends of migration to Europe. London Overseas Development Institute: 
Working Paper 430. Retrieved from https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/10157.pdf 
 
Dixon, Tim, et al. (2018). Attitudes towards national identity, immigration and refugees in Italy. 
Retrieved from 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a70a7c3010027736a22740f/t/5b5852700e2e72de2
784d45d/1532514941303/Italy+EN+Final_Digital_2B.pdf 
 
Di Quirico, Roberto. (2010). Italy and the global economic crisis. Bulletin of Italian Politics: Vol 
2, No 2, 3-19. Retrieved from https://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_191024_en.pdf 
 
European Parliament resolution of 30 May 2018 on the annual report on the functioning of the 
Schengen area. (2018). (European Parliament publication 2017/2256(INI)). Retrieved 
from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-
2018-0228+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN  
 
 
Salachi 39 
 
Explaining the rules for migrants: borders and asylum. (2015). Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/17/world/europe/europe-refugees-migrants-rules.html 
 
Felbermayr, G., Gröschl, J., & Steinwachs, T. (2016). Trade costs of border controls in the 
Schengen area. Retrieved from https://voxeu.org/article/trade-costs-border-controls-
schengen-area 
 
Global migration trends factsheet. (2017). Retrieved from http://gmdac.iom.int/global-migration-
trends-factsheet 
 
Gotev, Georgi. (2018). Italy threatens to veto EU’s long-term budget over migration crisis. 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/italy-threatens-to-veto-eus-
long-term-budget-over-migration-crisis/ 
 
Guild, E., Carrera, S., Vosyliute, L., Groenendijk, K., Brouwer, E., Bigo, D., Jeandesboz, J., 
Martin-Maze, M. (2016). Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen 
crisis-proof? [PDF] European Parliament Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs. Doi: 10.2861/585839 
 
Hermanin, Costanza. (2017). Immigration Policy in Italy: Problems and Perspectives. Istituti 
Affari Internazionali: IAI Working Papers 17/35. Retrieved from 
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1735.pdf 
 
Italy country profile. (2018). Retrieved from https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/ita/ 
 
Italy: Population density from 2007 to 2017 (inhabitants per square kilometer). (2018). Retrieved 
from https://www.statista.com/statistics/270469/population-density-in-italy/ 
 
Labour market: second quarter of 2018. (2018). Retrieved from 
https://www.istat.it/it/files//2018/09/EN_labour_market_Q2_2018-3.pdf 
Salachi 40 
 
Loucaides, Darren. (2018). The radical populist party that shook Italy’s establishment. Retrieved 
from https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-05-07/radical-populist-party-shook-italys-
establishment 
 
McAuliffe, Marie, & Ruhs, Martin. (2018). World migration report 2018. International 
Organization for Migration: World Migration Report No. 9. Retrieved from 
https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/china/r5_world_migration_report_20
18_en.pdf 
 
Migration and migrant population statistics. (2019). Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics#Migration_flows:_Im
migration_to_the_EU_from_non-member_countries_was_2.4_million_in_2017 
 
Migration to Europe in chart. (2018). Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
44660699 
 
Morsy, Hanan & Sgherri, Silvia. (2010). After the crisis: assessing the damage in Italy. IMF 
Working Paper: WP/10/244. Retrieved from 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp10244.pdf 
 
On the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 in order to provide for common rules on the temporary 
reintroduction of border control at internal borders in exceptional circumstances. (2012). 
European Parliament: Document 2011/0242(COD). Retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-
2012-0200+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN 
 
Palley, Thomas I. (2017). The fallacy of the globalization trilemma: reframing the political 
economy of globalization and implications for democracy. Macroeconomic Policy 
Institute Forum for Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Policy: Working Paper No. 8. 
Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Palley_dilemma%20(1).pdf 
 
Salachi 41 
 
Putting up barriers; Schengen's economic impact. (2016). The Economist: 418(8975), 20(US). 
Retrieved from 
http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A450846275/AONE?u=mlin_c_assumpt&sid=AONE
&xid=3657f689 
 
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a 
Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen 
Borders Code). (2016). Eur-Lex: Document 32016R0399. Retrieved from https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32016R0399 
 
Rodrik, Dani. (2011). The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the future of the world 
economy. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company. 
 
Rojo, David Fernandez. (2017). The European Border and Coast Guard: Towards the 
Centralization of the External Border Management? Retrieved from 
https://eutarn.blogactiv.eu/2017/02/07/the-european-border-and-coast-guard-towards-the-
centralization-of-the-external-border-management/ 
 
Schumacher, Elizabeth. (2018). Matteo Salvini: Italy’s far-right success story. Retrieved from 
https://www.dw.com/en/matteo-salvini-italys-far-right-success-story/a-42830366 
 
Securing Europe’s External Borders: A European Border and Coastal Guard Agency. (2017). 
European Commission: Publication 20171114. Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-
agenda-migration/20171114_ebcg_en.pdf  
 
Stiglitz, Joseph. (2016). ‘Flawed at birth’: why the Eurozone faces endless division. Retrieved 
from http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/economist-joseph-stiglitz-and-his-
discontents/ 
 
The Schengen acquis - Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 
between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their 
Salachi 42 
 
common borders. (1985). Eur-Lex: Document 42000A0922(02). Retrieved from 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:42000A0922%2802%29 
 
(2018). The World Factbook: Italy. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/it.html 
 
Tumpel-Gugerall, Gertrude. (2009). The European response to the financial crisis. Retrieved 
from https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2009/html/sp091016_1.en.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Salachi 43 
 
Works Cited: Images 
Image 1 (pg. 10) 
Italy and Italian Studies department. (2019). Retrieved from https://www.brynmawr.edu/italian/ 
 
Image 2 (pg. 17) 
Breene, Keith. (2016). This is how Europe’s borders have changed over 1,000 years. World 
Economic Forum. Retrieved from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/03/this-is-how-
europes-borders-have-changed-over-1-000-years/ 
 
Image 3 (pg. 21) 
EU’s Schengen area under threat. (2016). Retrieved from https://www.united-
europe.eu/2016/06/eus-schengen-area-under-threat/ 
 
 
 
 
 
